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PUSHING THE PICTORIAL TURN: MITCHELL, BENJAMIN, AND RELIGION ONLINE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis asserts a visual ontology as a way of understanding religious practice online.  
 W.J.T Mitchell argues twenty-first century humanities are shifting away from text 
and towards an interest in the meaning of images. However, he denies digital images a 
place within this pictorial turn, judging them banal. Mitchell’s theorization of new media 
is a postmodern rereading of Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction”. I argue that Mitchell’s utilization of Benjamin’s aura in his 
constructions of the human relationship to new media misinterprets the role of these 
technologies in relating the image to the object, and that digital images should be 
rethought in terms of a visual ontology. 
 The study of religion online has flourished as a subfield parallel to the increasing 
utilization of visual-digital media. Cross-disciplinary study of religion online reflects vast 
but methodologically shallow scholarship. Recent publications make an effort to deepen 
these theoretical investments, as the accumulated scholarship becomes self-reflexive. 
This thesis contributes both Mitchell’s picture theory and the exploration of a visual 
ontology to this new methodology. 
 As human interaction within digital media becomes predominantly visually based, 
there comes a need for parallel theorization of visually based being. Tensile interactions 
between text and image go beyond the metaphor of the “living image” and become 
towards a new way of being. Second Life, an inhabitable virtual world, exercises 
Mitchell’s tension between text and image, as both struggle to delimit means of 
experience. New object/image/text/picture orientations in virtual worlds like Second Life, 
particularly in its religious spaces, consequently create  new ways of being human within 
the visual-digital culture. Largely a re-reading of Mitchell and the deployment of his 
theory across the images of Second Life, this essay finds that Benjamin’s ideas of 
disembodied reproduction and the aura as lost through mechanical intervention fade as 
visual media becomes lived in and expressed outwardly as the avatar. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 New media has digitized the aesthetics of being human. Practices of being online 
in visual mediums reorient perceptions of identity, community and geography. This 
visual ontology is a reaction to a cultural pictorial turn. A reinvestment in the vitality of 
images converging with the advent of the digital-graphical mediation of the internet 
results in a new birth for the living image. Religious peoples and organizations have 
broadened possibilities for perception by inhabiting these digital-graphical mediums, 
practicing in virtual worlds like Second Life. Academic study of online religious 
practices reflects long-held anxieties surrounding humanity and the technological 
apparatus, filled with at first expectation, then cynic disappointment. Current scholars are 
rehearsing methodologies moving across disciplines. Engaging W.J.T. Mitchell’s method 
of “picturing theory” with a reading of Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction” this present thesis contributes to this movement of 
scholarship. I argue that to fully understand practices of being in digital media, we must 
elaborate a concept of visual ontology. 
 W.J.T. Mitchell (art, media and literary theorist and editor of Critical Inquiry) 
argues that a cultural “linguistic turn” has been replaced by a “pictorial turn”. Cultural 
valuations have shifted away from text and language and towards pictures and images. 
The pictorial turn is “the realization that while the problem of pictorial representation has 
always been with us, it presses inescapably now, and with unprecedented force, on every 
level of culture, from the most refined philosophical speculations to the most vulgar 
productions of mass media” (Picture Theory 16). Picture Theory is a method towards 
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discovering what pictures are: “The simplest way to put this is to say that, in what is 
often characterized as an age of “spectacle” (Guy Debord), “surveillance” (Foucault) and 
all-pervasive image making, we still do not know exactly what pictures are, what their 
relation to language is, how they operate on observers and on the world, how their history 
is to be understood, and what is to be done with or about them”( Picture Theory 13). A 
network of relationships between images, bodies and institutions constitutes Mitchell’s 
investment in the problem of pictorial representation in the contemporary moment.  
 Religion scholars are asking parallel questions of materiality and the image. The 
Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet observes “There are today several 
discussions from different disciplines especially focusing on sensual and bodily aspects 
which to some extent cross over seamlessly to discussions on ‘aesthetics’. Most 
prominent is probably the ‘visual culture debate’ and – in Religious Studies – the debate 
on ‘Material Religion” (4.1: 3). Works by Morgan (2007), Plate (2005), Latour (2002) 
Braiterman (2007) and others deal with visual consequences of and for religious practice. 
The materiality of digital mediums at the intersection of aesthetics and religion is 
contested. “Cyber religion”, “religion online” “online religion” “digital religion” and 
“religion and new media” designate a maturing subfield within Religious Studies also 
investigating these questions. Essential to this subfield are problems of authenticity, 
temporality, spatiality and interactivity. Scholars outside of the discipline –sociology, 
anthropology and communication and media studies - concurrently invest in questions of 
embodiment and community.  While methodologies range, these elemental concerns 
remain constant.  
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 Anxieties surrounding the positioning and preservation of humanity in relation to 
new image making technologies lead back to Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction”. His essay imbues aesthetics of religion
1
 , cultural 
media studies, and (in focus here) the work of W.J.T. Mitchell. The 1936 essay’s 
inspirational and enigmatic contribution to this history is the concept of aura. It is ideal, 
sacred and wholly distant. Aura radiates authenticity and originality - not conveying 
perpetual wholeness, but rather historical situation. Originality is not a condition of value, 
but of continuity. Aura functions as the indicator of originality, not as originality itself. 
Authenticity is an accumulation of time. Perceiving aura is perceiving immediately this 
aggregated historical distance. This distance is metaphysical
2
, manifested as a sense of 
majesty, awe and sacrality. Within the present project, aura congregates definitional 
language from Benjamin to Mitchell to construct a new origin of such emanation, human 
being as the original image.  
 Within the reach of aura - at its point of perception - is a mode of existence.
3
 
Means and meanings of authenticity are situated historically. Constructed through social 
valuations, authenticity and originality are perceived and appreciated through both 
historical and technical mediation. The origin of aura is historically determined. Societal 
transformations both regulate and reflect means of sense perception (Benjamin 222). It 
follows that the pictorial turn must participate in this bilateral exchange of valuation and 
perception. Digital aesthetics mediate modes of existence as visual digital media 
accelerates movement within the pictorial turn.
4
 Potential formal manifestations of being 
                                                 
1
 For more see: Plate Walter Benjamin, Religion and Aesthetics  
2
 See Plate  
3
 For more see Snyder in Smith 163-4 
4
 Nakamura argues that 1995 was the visual advent of the internet. 
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increase with the graphical capacities of digital media. Mitchell, however, devalues 
internet aesthetics within the pictorial moment.  Billed as a utopian escapism, for 
Mitchell the realization of digital images is trite. Reorienting Mitchell’s rubric, this 
project (through introducing digital images like those in Second Life) introduces picture 
theory to the subfield of online religion. 
 Second Life is an exemplar of a larger socio-cultural phenomenon. Facebook, 
Twitter, Tumblr, and YouTube all participate in the new visual medium, making up the 
technological apparatus of what I am labeling visual ontology. The dispersed nature of 
visual being, spanning content and platforms, requires a new vantage point. The work of 
Walter Benjamin, foundational in its cultural critique of mechanical (or technical) 
reproduction, fails to meet the expectations of new media. Benjamin’s language as 
deployed by W.J.T. Mitchell is an example of this failure. I do not mean to say that 
Mitchell has failed, but rather that his language has failed him. Mitchell’s “picturing 
theory” or picture theory is an idea that has the potential to change the language with 
which we talk about images and as a result, how we interact with them. Mitchell’s 
application of Benjamin in his theses on “Biocybernetic Media” represents a failed 
translation between old and new media. After laying out a genealogy of Mitchell’s theory 
anticipating its application, I reintroduce both Benjamin and Mitchell to the technological 
vocabulary available through digital mediums like Second Life. 
 Created by Linden Lab, Second Life became accessible in 2003, adding to the 
increasing number of virtual worlds appearing online at the time.
5
 These digital worlds 
share foundational characteristics, all presenting a contiguous series of navigable images 
that create the sensation of a stable “world” of images. Landscapes of earth, sea, sky, and 
                                                 
5
 For a list of these worlds see Bartle Designing Virtual Worlds 
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elaborate architectures can be moved on, in and around. These persistent images are 
navigated in real time.
6
 These images are referred to as “virtual worlds” because the 
images are shared, comprising multiple individuals simultaneously. Individuals navigate 
and experience such landscapes and architectures using graphical corporeal 
representations of selves. These individual representations are known as “avatars”. 
Second Life’s development company refers to it as a “… 3D world where everyone you 
see is a real person and every place you visit is built by people just like you” 
(SecondLife.com). There are few spaces within Second Life that were created by the 
administrators at Linden Lab besides locations for the education and orientation of new 
users. Individual, independent users plan and execute the architectures of Second Life. 
Tom Boellstorff, in his ethnography, remarks on the visual turn taking place: “A broad 
cultural shift during the time of my fieldwork was that the notion of “virtual world” 
increasingly presupposed three-dimensional visuality: a defining characteristic of a 
virtual world (versus a blog or a website) was that it was a place in which you could look 
around.”
 
(Boellstorff 92).Visual and textual relationships go beyond the images of 
Second Life. The whole of internet navigation requires the negotiation of a series of 
image-text relationships.  
 Looking around such visual-virtual spaces for the makings of a visual ontology 
and its potential impact on the subfield requires situating this exploration historically. 
The first section of this project surveys the foundations, reformations and expectations of 
the study of religion online. Beginning in the mid 1990’s and continuing to the present 
moment, this survey includes texts not specific to the study of religion online, but involve 
pertinent aspects of being in digital media. Routledge has published a series of texts that 
                                                 
6
 For an interesting theory of “game time” see Juul in First Person  131-142 
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follow the evolution of scholarship in religion online specifically. This series is 
frequently self-referential, composed amongst a community of scholars. As such, these 
texts define their own terms of scholarship, arguing for a coherent history. On the one 
hand, this canon could be viewed as isolated, isolating and limited in scope or breadth. 
On the other hand, the series could be used as a case study. Informed with and set in 
contrast to concurrent scholarship on the issue, it serves herein as micro-model of trends 
in the academic study of religion online.   
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A THEMATIC HISTORY OF THE STUDY OF RELIGION ONLINE 
 
 Dawson and Cowen introduce their formative collection on religion online urging 
us to remember two things: first, the growth of the popularity of the internet was 
extraordinary in its speed, and second, there is a very real “digital divide” in the world. 
While the expansion of the internet as a new medium was viral, access globally is still 
limited. Dawson and Cowen caution against the rhetoric of a global connectedness and 
remind us of the socio-economic position of the user (Dawson and Cowan 5). Citing the 
digital divide could be one reason to overlook the work this project hopes to accomplish. 
Citing the inaccessibility of the internet across the globe, one could argue that talking 
about a visual ontology within new media is an exclusive rhetoric. Benjamin argued that 
new public media was an inclusive (and oppressive) social force. The highest means of 
rhetorical manipulation take place within mechanical/technical media. I will not entertain 
a set of arguments against the legitimate concern regarding the digital divide but offer the 
possibility of this argument as recognition of its place in the academic context. 
   Christopher Helland’s “Popular Religion and the World Wide Web: A Match 
Made in (Cyber) Heaven” charts the parallel emergences of the popular graphical internet 
(as noted by Nakamura above) and religious practice online. Helland observes that “[a]s 
Internet communication became more popular, home computers became less expensive, 
and software made the whole process a lot more user friendly, computer-mediated 
communication expanded rapidly. By the mid-1990s the World Wide Web had come into 
existence, and people began to “surf” the Net, to create their own home pages, post their 
own data, and share information on a scale only made possible by this new technology. 
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To no one’s surprise, religion flourished on the internet” (Dawson and Cowen, 25). 
Helland’s survey of the growth of the internet and religious practice therein illustrates a 
history of an emerging media. Composed of case studies and situated practice, Helland 
illustrates a range of manifestations of religiosity online. This present project is less 
concerned with that history, and more interested in a critique of the study of these 
manifestations of online religion, looking at methods of scholarship.  
 Hojsgaard and Warburg’s 2005 collection (within the Routledge canon) identifies 
four so-called “waves” of scholarship of religion online. Movements between waves 
mark changes in both material and theoretical scope. Moving across only a decade it is 
difficult to agree with the authors that there are four distinct movements within this small 
time. On the other hand, the realization that the technology under investigation was 
changing at the same time as the theory strengthens the case for charting four “waves” in 
such a short time. Interactions between moving parts creates a turbulent landscape for 
developing, testing, and integrating methodology. The wave model indexes affective 
reactions to the technology within the scholarship. Engagement with these movements 
below (as well as with concurrent works) positions a picturing theory methodology 
arguing for a visual ontology inside (and outside) a scholarly lineage. 
 The first wave of scholarship began in the mid 1990’s, parallel with the pictorial 
turn in computer mediated communication. As the internet became a public media (a 
mass media), academics began to imagine its future implications for religious practice. 
This early research was optimistic and reactionary. Scholarship tended to frame religion 
online as a utopian “cyber religion” and fantasize about yet unrealized (and unrealizable) 
possibilities. Heidi Campbell categorizes the first wave as descriptive, offering “broad or 
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general surveys of religious engagement” and “positive reflections on how the Internet 
may reconnect people with spirituality in postmodern society” (Digital Religion 8). 
Hojsgaard and Warburg mark the first wave as having a lot of enthusiasm without 
“reference to situated practices” (Hojsgaard and Warburg 5). These reactions to new 
media were both utopic and dystopic, but, either way, in the extreme.  Such a mystified 
reaction to new media is familiar to Walter Benjamin. He writes this about scholarship on 
film (the new media at the time of his writing): “Characteristically, even today 
ultrareactionary authors give the film a similar contextual significance – if not an outright 
sacred one, then at least a supernatural one” (Benjamin 228). Early reactions to “cyber 
religion” shared this sacred or supernatural hue, viewing technological possibility with an 
uninformed reverence.  
 Stephen D. O’Leary is credited for starting this first wave of research. His essay 
“Cyberspace as Sacred Space: Communicating Religion on Computer Networks” “seeks 
not to provide a comprehensive map of religious landscapes in cyberspace nor an in-
depth analysis of the communicative practices of an particular religious community, but 
only to speculate on the transformation of religious beliefs and practices as these are 
mediated by new technologies”(Dawson and Cowan 37). This speculation results in a 
mediated theory of religious practice, working through the cultural-evolution theory of 
Walter J. Ong. While O’Leary’s conclusions maintain a utopian optimism, they arrive 
from the application of previously established theoretical models to the materiality of a 
new medium. Bringing the situated practices of new media together with Ong’s concept 
of a “second orality”, O’Leary effectively performs the synthesis of ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
media studies. O’Leary’s formative article has served as an inspiration for this present 
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project, not for its conclusions but for its methodology. The way that O’Leary 
incorporates the voice of Ong serves as a model for my own deployment of W.J.T. 
Mitchell. 
 The so-called “second wave” of scholarship faced the consequences resultant of 
initial utopian and dystopian prophecies. Campbell describes this wave as “the 
categorical” (Digital Religion 9) as scholars felt the need to locate their scholarship, and 
realized a societal influence on the technologies of new religious practices.  The 
introduction to Dawson and Cowen’s 2004 text, resting on the cresting second wave, 
charts these expectations and disappointments. Dawson and Cowen correctly hold both 
the scholarship and the religious practices themselves responsible for these failings: 
“…much of today’s online activity is rather pedestrian and anticlimactic when compared 
to the initial hype and rhetoric” (Dawson and Cowan 6). This language of a pedestrian 
and banal digital experience will reappear below in W.J.T. Mitchell’s reactions to the 
aesthetics of the internet. Second wave scholarship labored to move the study of religion 
online out of the speculative and into a proper subfield, establishing a constellation of 
questions and a vocabulary which remain in emerging scholarship.  
 O’Leary second essay exemplifies the observed resonance between the first and 
second “waves”. I mention it not for its influence on later scholarship, but to create a 
sense of continuity between tones in the scholarship. O’Leary self-diagnoses himself with 
a “cyber-pessimism” (Hojsgaard and Warburg 38), citing a gulf between his predictions 
about the graphical interfaces and their manifestations. Pessimism does not lead to 
dystopic thinking however. Characteristic of contemporary scholarship, O’Leary tempers 
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his fascination with situation. Early online churches, holy sights and virtual pilgrimages
7
 
all serve as locations for O’Leary’s theoretical work. Looking forward O’Leary sees that 
“the designers of online virtual worlds are nowhere near close to exploiting the latent 
capabilities of the World Wide Web, as it now exists. The state of the art in digital 
religion will have to become considerably more sophisticated in its presentation of the 
visual, aural and symbolic dimensions of religion to create a serious experience of the 
virtual sacred. Let us assume, however, that further steps will be taken in this direction, 
that as a new generation comes of age for whom the Web is a fully naturalized symbolic 
environment, we will see artists, designers, and worship leaders collaborating to extend 
religion further into the digital realm” (Hojsgaard and Warburg 43). A more advanced 
virtual experience will arrive as the internet becomes a “naturalized symbolic 
environment” (a term which resonates with Mitchell’s ideas on media as habitat, taken 
into account below). 
 Contemporary scholarship in this still establishing subfield has moved across the 
disciplines. Recent (2008-13) scholarship dealing directly with religion in new media 
reflects an increased awareness of the importance of new media to the humanities. Heidi 
Campbell’s When Religion Meets New Media (2010) depicts an encounter or a conflict of 
two distinct objects and their mutual negotiation. For Campbell, media and religion are 
discrete objects. Campbell gives examples of either acceptance or rejection of new media 
within religious communities, and characterizes this (admittedly) complicated 
relationship in a dual tradition/media division. In contrast, Rachel Wagner’s GodWired 
(2012) fosters a more nuanced theoretical approach to virtual space as ritual space.  
Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds (2013) pushes 
                                                 
7
 For more on the virtual pilgrimage see both Hill-Smith and Helland 
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digital religious practice forward as serious space for inquiry. Emerging researchers in 
the field include Hill-Smith (2011), Helland (2010) and Connelly (2010). Each work 
exemplifies the rapid movement in scholarship away from a confrontation with or 
idealization of new media towards a mediated approach to thinking about graphical 
digital environments. Each of these pieces recognizes the expanding and troubled sense 
of “media” in new media. This thesis pushes the trend forward, utilizing Mitchell’s 
picture theory as a way of arguing for a visual ontology with digital graphical practices.  
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PREVALENT TRENDS IN THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF RELIGION ONLINE 
 Three themes, generated within the second wave of research and sustained 
through the latest collections, permeate cross-disciplinary study within the subfield: 
Issues of authenticity, temporality and spatiality, and interactivity. These themes are 
addressed explicitly in Campbell’s latest collection, spread across six chapters entitled 
“Ritual”, “Identity”, ”Community”, “Authority”, “Authenticity” and “Religion”. Six can 
be collapsed into three for brevity’s sake. Parts of “Identity” and “Ritual” fall under 
spatiality and temporality, dealing with the demarcation of space and time by both bodies 
and ritual. “Community” and parts of “Authority” fall under interactivity, dealing with 
the efficacy of communication. Parts of “Authority” and “Religion” fall under my 
categorization of Authenticity. Below I provide a quick glance at some instances of each 
in the literature. 
 Both Radde-Antweiler and Connelly take up problems of authenticity and 
possibilities for an authentic experience in digital spaces. Louise Connelly provides a 
case study of Buddhist mediation in Second Life. Radde-Antweiler, citing Benjamin on 
aura, examines distinctions commonly made in the subfield between the ‘virtual and the 
‘real’: “The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its 
beginning, ranging from it substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it 
experience” (Digital Religion 96).  Radde-Antweiler’s reading of this passage slips into a 
trite rationalization for the “mediatization” (a semi-technical term) of everything, making 
the argument that every kind of interaction is mediated in one way or another, and in that 
sense, a digital interaction is as authentic as any other. This reading of Benjamin’s 
passage lacks a distinction between authenticity and mediation, aura and media. Radde-
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Antweiler mistreatment of Benjamin results in a missed opportunity for exercising his 
usefulness in explaining new media.  
 Stephen D. O’Leary’s second essay, characterized by his cyber-pessimism, 
investigates spatial possibilities within digital media. Interrogating the capabilities of new 
media formats to execute ritual function, O’Leary does “not believe that any cyber-ritual 
– even one that makes full use of the latent capabilities of current Internet technology – 
will ever be able to replace ritual performances in a physical sacred space”( Hojsgaard 
and Warburg 44). O’Leary touches on a common dichotomy playing out in the study of 
religion online as mentioned above between the virtual and the real, and the expectations 
that are held for each. Lorne L. Dawson sees the study of religion online being “held in 
check by a tendency to understand new media in terms of more familiar old media” 
(Hojsgaard and Warburg 32). This present thesis posits that same assertion. Both Dawson 
and O’Leary rest on the tipping point between an old media aesthetic and a new media 
aesthetic, what O’Leary called a “fully naturalized symbolic environment”( Hojsgaard 
and Warburg 43). Dawson destabilizes the expectations of an old media orientation, 
touching on interactivity as well, seeing it as “what most distinguishes the Internet from 
all other modern mass media. Computer-mediated communication is a group 
phenomenon; it is inherently social” (Hojsgaard and Warburg 31).  
 In the same volume, Debbie Herring pushes this interactivity even further, into 
what she labels a “contextual theology”, a theology that “takes as its starting point not 
statements about God but the context where people are engaging with God, and the 
religious thinking that occurs as a result of the particular characteristics of that 
context…Contextual theology is situated, specific and self-conscious, and the process, 
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reflection and action that occur arise from the people and their particular 
circumstances(Hojsgaard and Warburg 149). Herring brings this methodology to the 
study of an Internet news and chat website dedicated to Christianity.  Herring challenges 
a normative way of researching religion online and, like O’Leary, introduces the study to 
a different methodology. Contextual theology involves similar theoretical commitments 
to Mitchell’s picture theory, as explicated in the second section of this essay.  
 Interest in these issues of authenticity, spatiality/temporality and interactivity 
appear outside of the smaller subfield. Pierre Levy constructs a philosophy of being in the 
digital age in the companion texts Collective Intelligence (1994) and Becoming Virtual 
(1995). Lévy’s concept of the “hyperbody” influenced designs and consequent 
theorization of virtual bodies and selves. Another influential work still cited in current 
scholarship is Julian Dibbell’s depiction of society inside a fully textual chat room known 
as LambaMOO (Dibbell 1992). Dibbell’s treatment of virtual reality as a location of 
meaningful interaction resonates through contemporary ethnographies and anthropology 
of digital environments. More contemporary works within the thematic triad include T.L 
Taylor’s Play Between Worlds (2006), Ralph Schroeder’s edited volume The Social Life 
of Avatars (2002), and the sociological and ethnographic work of Christine Hine (2000). 
Boellstorff’s Coming of Age in Second Life (2008) is an ethnographic look at the virtual 
world which engages closely with habitual problems of authentic embodiment, 
negotiating time and space, and interpreting interactivity.  
 A larger issue overarching these identified themes within the scholarship is a 
problematic theoretical and categorical relationship between religion and digital media. 
The title of Heidi Campbell’s 2010 monograph When Religion Meets New Media 
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exemplifies the type of essentializing within the literature, putting religious groups in 
opposition to how they shape technology. Campbell introduces her religious-social 
shaping of technology, which presents technological change and user innovation as a 
social process. It places researchers’ attention on how and why a community of users 
responds to a technology in a certain way, and calls them to identify what values or 
beliefs influence this negotiation. There are two major problems with this approach. First, 
it incapacitates both “religion” and “technology”. Within the “SST” model (as it is called) 
religion and technology are both social aspects which are manipulated and shaped within 
a social group. The boundaries between these three essentialized positions do not bleed at 
all. This leads to the second problem: this approach ignores any religious aspects of the 
technology itself, setting up an encounter between the two static entities.   
 Stewart Hoover identifies a tendency to either “essentialize” or “particularize” the 
digital: “First, by ‘essentializing,’ I mean that some tend to evaluate the digital and digital 
practice in relation to what it does, what it stands for, or whom it effectively stands in for. 
This means we see the digital as a pundit or poor substitute for the actual and authentic 
role played by religion. The second response, to ‘particularize’ the digital, means 
‘instrumentalizing’ it and thinking about how digital culture and practice might serve or 
stand in for prior means of mediation and other forms of practice”(Digital Religion 266). 
Campbell’s approach performs such movements upon religions and technologies.  
Campbell’s “religious-social shaping of technology” treats religious practices and 
communities as discrete group of beliefs or peoples. New media and technology are, in 
Hoover’s words, a “stand in” for prior means of mediation. Campbell labels this process 
one of “negotiation”: “Here religious communities draw on their history, tradition and 
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their core beliefs as a basis for established patterns of media use. They must consider in 
what respect this new form of media mirrors past technology to see if old rules apply” 
(When Religion Meets New Media 61).  
 Combinations of definitional frameworks transform the appearance of a 
methodology. Conceptions and definitions of both ‘religion’ and ‘technology’ are 
necessarily included in the literature. The problem with such a concrete binary language 
is most visible in the work of Heidi Campbell, and her process of “negotiation”. Knut 
Lundby picks up on the shifting binaries between “technology” and “religion”, and 
identifies a spectrum of these relationships. Methodologies range from the philosophical 
to the situated case study and from a technological determinism to a social shaping of 
technology (Digital Religion 225-35).  
 
Figure 1. (Digital Religion 227) 
This spectrum (and Lundby’s subsequent articulation of the chart) reveal the determinant 
variable within the shifting subfield to be the “approach to the study of media and 
religion” rather than the “definition of religion”. Interpretations of technology and media 
move the methodology, while static definitions of “religion” move passively within the 
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theoretical frame.  The history of the study of religion in new media is more a study of 
new media than of religion.  
 Stewart Hoover demands a changed approach: “We must see digital religion as 
being about the generation of models of practice and the ability to produce meaning in 
the world that relates to the religious” (Digital Religion 268). This concept of ‘meaning 
making’ drives the Center for Media, Religion and Culture founded by Hoover in 2006 
(cmrc.colorado.edu). Hoover’s understanding of “the religious” is more fluid than a 
definitional. Referring to “the religious” rather than “religion” transforms Hoover’s 
question into one of experience as opposed to institution. Orienting a study of religion 
around a theoretical engagement with “models of practice” and the production of 
meaning are attuned to a way of being in graphical new media. Reference to digital 
religion and generation of models ‘world’ media, rather than treating it as a utilitarian 
technology. Hoover continues: “A colleague of mine has remarked that in many ways 
what really defines much of online practice is the aesthetic rather that the cognitive or 
perceptive logic of the digital. What do technologies hail us into because of the abilities 
they have for us in terms of aesthetic purposes and qualities?”(Digital Religion 268).This 
question of aesthetics as posed by Hoover is one this thesis works to answer. Looking 
forward to an apparent fourth wave of research, I work to engage a new materiality of 
religion with a canon of visual theory. 
 Authenticity, temporality/spatiality and interactivity haunt the study of digital 
religion. This project involves these problems in a theoretical framework provided by 
W.J.T. Mitchell. “Picture Theory” (or picturing theory) is a means of directly interfacing 
a visual nature of being with the triptych of issues pertinent to the study of digital religion. 
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Mitchell’s methodology, inherent in his argument for a cultural pictorial turn, cultivates 
three useful theoretical devices. Concepts of the imagetext, the living – social image and 
biocybernetic reproduction all inform a way of being visually. The intellectual labor 
below involves a folding out of these tools for their use in describing a visual ontology in 
digital media. To begin I introduce Mitchell’s argument for the pictorial turn. The section 
that follows this deals explicitly in Mitchell’s language, accessing his meaning and 
establishing a theoretical framework. I then turn to Mitchell’s address to new media, and 
his concept of “biocybernetic reproduction”. Here begins the injection of Benjamin’s 
language, and the three concerns of digital religion scholarship. Offering a re-reading of 
Benjamin through Mitchell, this section reorients thinking about new media through 
Benjamin’s concepts of “aura” and “apparatus”. I close this project by suggesting that 
thinking through a visual ontology frees religion online from tired tropes within the 
scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
ON PICTURING THEORY 
Mitchell’s assessment of an erupting moment in cultural critique is revelatory.  An 
observable swell of intellectual investment in questions of both materiality and visuality 
across the Humanities and in the particular field of Religious Studies attest to Mitchell’s 
accuracy. The pictorial turn as an intellectual movement is changing the way images are 
accounted for, validated, and valued. This turn is evident in an increased study of media, 
along with the parallel material turn. The rise of digital (or “new” media) takes place at 
the same time as the beginnings of Mitchell’s turn. Lisa Nakamura cites the launch of 
Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer in 1994 and 1995 as the dawn of the graphical-
digital interface (Nakamura 1).  Digital media remains largely a visual experience. In 
worlds like Second Life, where the capability for chatting through audio channels is 
possible, text remains the predominant means of communication.
8
  All popular interfaces 
with internet technologies involve negotiating image-text relationships. Mitchell’s 
theorizing of this cultural movement becomes of great importance due to the dominant 
visuality of digital media, and the virtual experience’s involvement in the pictorial turn. 
Picture theory is essential to understanding ways of being in digital environments and the 
consequences of these ways of being on religious practice. The question is how to apply 
picture theory (or “picturing theory”) to religious practice in digital-graphical 
environments. What pieces of picture theory makes it a unique way of seeing religious 
images? 
 The Pictorial Turn and Picture Theory are separate ideas. The first is a movement, 
the second a method. Much of Picture Theory and What Do Pictures Want? outlines and 
applies this method. Picturing theory is first exercised through what Mitchell labels 
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“metapictures”. Metapictures are described as “pictures about pictures – that is, pictures 
that refer to themselves or to other pictures, pictures that are used to show what a picture 
is” (Picture Theory 35). These pictures call into question the constitution, creation and 
observation of pictures
9
.  Metapictures question the state of the picture or the act of 
picturing. These images perform a methodology Mitchell is hoping to articulate and he 
floats these images as part of the maiden voyage of his picturing theory. Pictures about 
pictures necessarily ask questions on their own terms. This questioning of pictures by 
pictures reveals one of Mitchell’s larger theses on media.  
   Media theory cannot rise above the media it examines (What Do Pictures Want 
210). Metapictures are self-reflexive. Mitchell’s picture theory is self-conscious. Theory 
reflects the media it critiques. Articulating appropriate or applicable theory means 
articulating the media at hand. Methodologically, the act of “picturing” is “an embodied 
discourse, one that is constructed around critical metaphors, analogies, models, figures, 
cases and scenes”( What Do Pictures Want 209). Mitchell pursues a way of articulating 
theory within a medium. Opposed to “the metalanguage of systems theory or semiotics, 
for instance, [that] might lift us out of the welter of media and give us a neutral scientific 
perspective on the totality of media… [m]y approach is just the opposite. It assumes that 
no theory of media can rise above the media themselves, and that what is required are 
forms of vernacular theory embedded in media practices” (What Do Pictures Want 210). 
Mitchell, beginning with Picture Theory, hopes to cultivate a theory that takes an 
““ordinary language” view of pictures and images, a treatment of representation as a 
vernacular phenomenon” (Picture Theory 36).  
                                                 
9
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 Fostering this vernacular requires Mitchell break down a semantic hierarchy 
between image and text. It is the seeming impossibility of a theory made up of pictures 
that historically gives precedent to the text as descriptor. In order for images to be useful 
as a catalyst, medium and means for theoretical labor, they would seemingly have to 
achieve the level of textual description. Mitchell wants to break down image-text 
distinctions at the site of this dialectical tension. Mitchell articulates these varying power 
relationships through technical combinations of “image” and “text”: “I will employ the 
typographic convention of the slash to designate ‘image/text’ as a problematic gap, 
cleavage, or rupture in representation. The term ‘imagetext’ designates composite, 
synthetic works (or concepts) that combine image and text. ‘Image-text’, with a hyphen, 
designates relations of the visual and the verbal” (Picture Theory footnote 89). The 
gradation of Mitchell’s three formulations of “image text” destabilizes relations between 
discourse and representation. 
 Specifically, Mitchell wants to release “speech acts” from a purely textual 
medium: “Language can stand in for depiction and depiction can stand in for language 
because communicative, expressive acts, narration, argument, description, exposition and 
other so-called ‘speech acts’ are not medium-specific, are not ‘proper’ to some medium 
or other. I can make a promise or threaten with a visual sign as eloquently as with an 
utterance” (Picture Theory 160). Disrupting the hierarchy is part of Mitchell’s larger 
project defending the utility of Visual Studies as a discipline.  “One lesson of general 
semiotics, then, is that there is , semantically speaking (that is in the pragmatics of 
communication, symbolic behavior, expression, signification) no essential difference 
between texts and images the other lesson is that there are important differences between 
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visual and verbal media at the level of sign-types, forms, materials of representation, and 
institutional traditions. The mystery is why we have this urge to treat the medium as is it 
were the message, why we make the obvious practical differences between these two 
media into metaphysical oppositions which seem to control our communicative 
acts…”( Picture Theory 161). The rupture of representation caused by the image/text 
“opens the possibility of other relations between texts and visual images, and the de-
disciplining of the divisions between visual and verbal culture” (Picture Theory 100).   
 The image/text as opening is exactly that, a space rather than a method, a way of 
seeing: “The image/text is neither a method nor a guarantee of historical discovery; it is 
more like an aperture or cleavage in representation…” (Picture Theory 104). An opening 
is what allows images and texts to represent with the same authority. Mitchell grounds 
his ability to picture theory on this representational egalitarianism. Clarifying that this act 
of equality is not one of leveling or flattening, Mitchell nuances the “image/text” rupture:  
“The image/text is not a template to reduce these things [image and text] to the same 
form, but a lever to pry them open. It might be best described, not as a concept, but as a 
theoretical figure rather like Derrida’s différance, a site of dialectical tension, slippage 
and transformation” (Picture Theory 106). The “figure” of the image/text as aperture, 
rupture and open possibility permits the transforming the reading of pictures and a 
picturing of theory. The image/text as a heterogeneous figure of representation allows for 
image and text to be expressed each in their own vernacular.  
 I repeat and emphasize “vernacular” because it elucidates the position from which 
Mitchell evaluates pictures and images. The vernacular position argues for the usefulness 
of picture theory in understanding visual being in digital religion. In order to appreciate 
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the vernacular it is necessary to understand Mitchell’s own larger institutional stance. 
Mitchell is in defense of Visual Studies as a viable discipline. In the chapter “Showing 
Seeing” (What Do Pictures Want 336) he differentiates Visual Studies from more 
established disciplines of art history and aesthetics. Defining Visual Studies through a 
series of debunked myths and counter-theses, Mitchell chisels out a platform for this 
fledgling discipline amongst established fields in the Humanities. At the core of this 
differentiation is Visual Studies as a medium itself, concerned with facilitating 
relationships between seen and unseen, art and non-art, varying sensory modes, everyday 
seeing and showing, and “the visual construction of the social, not just the social 
construction of the vision”( What Do Pictures Want 343). Visual Studies does not offer 
an apologetic approach to images or a softening or “liquidation of art as we have known 
it” (What Do Pictures Want 342). Rather, Visual Studies takes seriously the idea of a 
visual culture or a visual nature, the way everyday seeing and showing dictate social 
order. A vernacular methodology is part of this inhabited theory of seeing images.  
   The pictorial turn (and the reflexive theory) is a “postlinguistic, postsemiotic 
rediscovery of the picture as a complex interplay between visuality, apparatus, institution, 
discourse, bodies and figurality. It is the realization that spectatorship (the look, the gaze, 
the glance, the practices of observation, surveillance, and visual pleasure) may be as deep 
a problem as various forms of reading (decipherment, decoding, interpretation, etc.) and 
that the visual experience of ‘visual literacy’ might not be fully explicable on the model 
of textuality” (Picture Theory 16). The image as interwoven with apparatus, bodies etc. 
becomes subject to Visual Studies. The discipline expands means of analysis beyond a 
textual base. Metapictures come to the front, the grammar of non-textual analysis 
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becomes a vernacular one. Pictures talk about themselves in their own language. 
“Representation as a vernacular phenomenon” (Picture Theory 36) (steeped in the 
context of the media being theorized) invites what I label a visual ontology, a means of 
speaking about images in a language of experience rather than observation. Mitchell 
realizes “…the problem of pictorial representation has always been with us, [but] it 
presses inescapably now, and with unprecedented force, on every level of culture, from 
the most refined philosophical speculations to the most vulgar productions of the mass 
media”( Picture Theory 16). Traditional forms of analysis are no longer adequate or 
applicable. Means of representation becomes means of understanding. Modes of 
valuation begin to shift and questions of observation become ones of experience. Visual 
ontology is a realization of the change in the treatment of images and the resulting 
adaptation in methodology. This adaptation is inspired by Mitchell’s defense of Visual 
Studies and his treatment of the image under picture theory. 
 How does picture theory conceive the image under this new model?  In order to 
properly deploy this methodology over digital-graphical practices of worlds like Second 
Life, I first must articulate the treatment of the image under picture theory. It is necessary 
to understand what Mitchell desires from images and pictures. He proposes we treat 
images as living organisms, as bios. The conception of the living picture has a 
multifaceted and extensive history, and Mitchell accepts the metaphor as well worn, 
stating: “My only contribution is to update it, to insert it into the new context of 
biological science and evolutionary thinking and propose a generalizing of the mutual 
mapping of iconology and natural history” (What Do Pictures Want 89). My focus (due 
to scope) will remain on Mitchell’s use of the living picture idea and its immediate 
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application to methodology. Mitchell recognizes the vitality of the metaphor of the 
“living image.” He recognizes the influence of the image on the study of visual culture in 
contemporary discourse:
10
 “There is no difficulty, then, in demonstrating that the idea of 
the personhood of pictures (or, at minimum, their animism) is just as alive in the modern 
world as it was in traditional societies.” Examples include magic portraits, mirrors, 
haunted houses and living statues (What Do Pictures Want 32). Mitchell’s question 
becomes: what do we do after we recognize the personhood of an image? How does this 
metaphor usefully transform itself into a mode of valuating images?  
 Lines of inquiry that intersect images transform when treating the image as alive. 
Mitchell wants to effectively broaden the working vocabulary of the living image. This 
necessitates transforming the types of questions we ask of images. As images become 
more and more alive, their needs increase. If the personhood of images comes something 
close to concrete, questions of “power” become those of “desire” and questions of 
“value” become those of “vitality” (What Do Pictures Want 33). Mitchell finds an 
image’s vitality and a pictures value weighed on separate scales. For an image, being 
independent of any particular medium, “…the question of vitality has more to do with 
reproductive potency or fertility…with an image, the question is, Is it likely to go on and 
reproduce itself, increasing its population or evolving into surprising new forms?”(What 
Do Pictures Want 90).
11
 For a picture, the particular incarnation of an image bound to a 
medium, vitality is dependent on its capacity for “…liveliness of lifelikeness, a sense that 
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that spread across various internet platforms and receive uniquely high levels of attention are labeled 
“viral”. 
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he picture either ‘captures the life’ of its model, or that it has in its own formal qualities 
an energetic, animated or lively appearance” (What Do Pictures Want 90).  
 Picture and image both have the capacity for life, depending upon media in one 
form or the other. The former for its capacity to exist at all, the latter for its propensity to 
proliferate. Media both binds and distinguishes picture and image. Both require a medium 
through which to “go on” or “go before” 
 
(What Do Pictures Want 87). The living image 
as Mitchell sees it is reflected in his figuration of media. Living images and pictures are 
social creatures. They move forward, regenerate and interact with each other through 
media. Media, then, is where these pictures and images live. But media is also the means 
by which images or pictures (and individuals) communicate across distance. Mitchell 
expands on the definitional dilemma: “If media are middles, they are ever-elastic middles 
that expand to include what look at first like their outer boundaries. The medium does not 
lie between sender and receiver; it includes and constitutes them” (What Do Pictures 
Want 204). Mitchell acutely touches on a boundary problem of media. Media is the 
means both “through which” and “in which” images interact (What Do Pictures Want 
208).The questions becomes where do images live? What is media for the living social 
image? 
 Raymond Williams suggests defining media as a material social practice and do 
away with any reified sense of media as thing (What Do Pictures Want 204). This 
definition opens an endlessly mediated “Pandora’s box” for Mitchell (213) (much like 
Radde-Antweiler "mediatiztion” of everything), and Williams’ definition requires further 
refinement. This unbound definition is not useful when trying to think through new the 
living image.  Mitchell consequently develops ten theses on media, in an attempt to corral 
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his sense of the term. Since my focus is on how picture theory as a methodology is useful 
for talking about religious practice and digital images, I attend only to Mitchell’s third 
thesis, his most provocative: “A medium is both a system and an environment” (What Do 
Pictures Want 210). Media or medium in this formation maintains both its material and 
social characteristics. “A medium, in short, is not just a set of materials, an apparatus, or 
a code that “mediates” between individuals. It is a complex social institution that contains 
individuals within it, and is constituted by a history of practices, rituals and habits, skills 
and techniques, as well as by a set of material objects and spaces (stages, studios, easel 
paintings, television sets, laptop computers)”( What Do Pictures Want 213). Images live 
within the social environment of the medium. This assumption is at the core of Mitchell’s 
methodology of “picturing theory” along with taking the role of Visual Studies to be the 
study of “everyday seeing and showing” (What Do Pictures Want 343).  
 Pictures are social creatures. The theorization of a picture cannot escape its 
surroundings. Taking root in Picture Theory and coming to bloom in What Do Pictures 
Want? these ideas are the seeds of Mitchell’s tensions between pictures and media. These 
two theses comprise the discussion of images, beyond questions of the “metapicture” or 
“ekphrasis”
12
 or the difference between “imagetext” “image/text” and “image-text.” 
While such a specialized vocabulary explicates the particularities of Mitchell’s fight for 
the image, it need not be deployed in every instance or application of picturing theory. 
Centered between the living image and the theory of its environment is Mitchell’s call for 
a “vernacular” theory of images. This is at the center of the methodology.  
 Going “Beyond Comparison” (Picture Theory 83) Mitchell argues that within a 
picturing methodology, comparative discourse need not be imported, as it is present 
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within the medium or the work itself: “The first place to look for the appropriate 
description language for analyzing the formal heterogeneity of a representation is in the 
representation itself, and in the institutional metalanguage- an immanent vernacular, not a 
transdisciplinary theory- of the medium to which it belongs”(100). The “immanent 
vernacular” is contained within the picture. A vernacular theory of images is not a dirge 
for the comparative method or for the discipline of art history. It is unique to the practice 
of Visual Studies. Vernacular languages of description are symptomatic of a semantic 
leveling between images, texts and medium that is “…greeted with alarm by 
unreconstructed high modernists and old-fashioned aesthetes, and heralded as a 
revolutionary breakthrough by the theorists of visual culture” (What Do Pictures Want 
346). Vernacular theory and semantic democracy as possibilities are accessible through 
the “aperture or cleavage” opened by the imagetext of picture theory (Picture Theory 
104).  
 My desire for using vernacular theory is not to impose picture theory upon the 
images of new religious practice, but rather to see if Mitchell’s image of theory has 
“legs.”
13
 I suggest that thinking the living, personified, and desiring image through the 
animated avatars and architectures like those of Second Life demands the living image be 
taken as a literal statement rather than a metaphoric one. The analogy between images 
and organisms is admittedly nothing new, and Mitchell only wishes to “update it” and 
insert it into new contexts (What Do Pictures Want 89). I perform the same movement 
within this present essay, updating Mitchell’s formal theoretical structure parallel to his 
analysis of the image in new media. The latter change necessitates the former. Through 
adapting a vernacular descriptive language of theory, Mitchell’s predictions for the future 
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of media foundationally reconfigure the unfolding theoretical articulations of the image 
that follow. As a result of this interweaving, my present argument for a new way of being 
visually in digital mediums must be first steeped in Mitchell’s own critique of the digital 
image, wrung dry and then reformed around observed practices surrounding new media. 
This evolution of theory will result in dramatically different valuations and 
representations of the personified image, questions of vitality and value, and possibilities 
for the image-text/subject-object relationship than those put forth by Mitchell. 
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MITCHELL ON BENJAMIN - AND BIOCYBERNETIC REPRODUCTION 
 
 A critique of new media using picture theory must be born out of Mitchell’s 
formulations of emerging means of image making. Representations of new media in 
What Do Pictures Want? constitute a subsequent theory of new images. These 
representations delineate Mitchell’s theoretical vernacular. Mitchell begins his look 
forward to new media by pushing his own metaphor: “The life of images has taken a 
decisive turn in our time: the oldest myth about the creation of living images, the 
fabrication of intelligent organisms by artificial, technical means, has now become a 
theoretical and practical possibility, thanks to new constellations of media at many 
different levels” (What Do Pictures Want 309). Mitchell and I agree that images are 
coming to life. The meaning of the living image is beginning to change, moving beyond 
the metaphorical into the practical. It is the ways and means of this animation that I 
question. Mitchell proposes “biocybernetic reproduction” (What Do Pictures Want 312), 
as a way of labeling this change.  
 Biocybernetic reproduction, narrowly defined by Mitchell, is the introduction of 
computer technology to biological science and resulting genetic engineering and cloning 
capabilities. Broadly speaking, biocybernetic reproduction includes both “…the 
grandiose plans to engineer a brave new world of perfect cyborgs to the familiar scene of 
the American health club, where obese, middle-aged consumers are sweating and 
straining while wired up to any number of digital monitors that keep track of their vital 
signs and even more vital statistics…”( What Do Pictures Want 312). More omnipresent 
examples might include the tactile interface of tablet computers and smartphones and full 
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body scans at airport security. Mitchell sees these new relationships between the bios and 
the cyber rewriting dialectics of “…nature and culture, human beings and their tools, 
artifacts, machines and media…”( What Do Pictures Want 314). As Mitchell notes, not 
only are living things become more like machines, machines are becoming more like 
living things (What Do Pictures Want 314). Intersections between humanity and 
technology, the bios and the cyber, indicate a blurring of lines between the two.  
 Messy parallel integrations redefine the limits of both bios and cyber. Mitchell 
couches this new landscape of humanity and technology in a larger struggle for power (or 
desire) between “...the image and the word, the idol and the law” (What Do Pictures 
Want 314), marking the structural, technical, coded cyber as “word” and the affective, 
analogical and sensational bios as “image”. This suggested parallel relationship expands 
the frame for thinking about bleeding boundaries between bios and cyber: “Raymond 
Bellour notes that ‘all French reflection for half a century has been drawn between the 
pincers of the word and the image’”(3 What Do Pictures Want 15). Beyond French 
thinkers, the tension between image and text makes up the entirety of picturing theory. 
Claims for semantic control and a vernacular way of thinking about imagetexts (or 
image/text or image-text) are performed by a constant making and breaking of boundaries 
between words and images. Mitchell suggests this making and breaking is visible in the 
means of biocybernetic reproduction. Within mediums which can broadly be described as 
biocybernetic or “new” or digital,  hierarchies of the word over the image are being 
questioned:  “[t]he digital is declared to be triumphant at the very same moment that a 
frenzy of the image and spectacle is announced. Which is it? The word or the image?” 
(What Do Pictures Want 315).  
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 What seems a strange question for Mitchell (given his belief in the imagetext) 
begins an unraveling between theory and observation. Even if this question is posed 
sardonically (by now we should know there is no definite image or text) it leads to a 
series of steps that distance Mitchell’s theoretical assumptions from an observable world 
of digital images. This question as posed by Mitchell begins a series of departures 
between his picturing of the digital image and my own material observations in instances 
like Second Life. In his observation of new images, Mitchell concentrates on 
representations of digital being. These include the science fiction fantasies of films like 
Jurassic Park, Terminator 2 and The Matrix (What Do Pictures Want 316-7). Little 
attention is paid to the visual practices taking place within new media.
14
 Images of the 
internet and the social practices surrounding them are not part of Mitchell’s picture of 
biocybernetic reproduction.  Outdated fantasies of bio-cyber relationships take their place. 
Jurassic Park and Terminator 2 for example were released in 1993 and 1991 respectively, 
almost ten years before the chapter on new media was written.  
 Intertwined obstacles of time and distance prevent Mitchell’s chapter from 
accurately representing the lives of images in new media. Time presents an obstacle 
because the metapictures that Mitchell uses to describe biocybernetics were out of date 
when he used them, and now are twenty years past. Granted, it’s impossible to 
perpetually describe the current moment. However, it is essential to new media studies 
that such description reflect an active population rather than the depiction of such a 
population through science fiction. Fantastic and ungrounded depictions of bio-cyber 
interaction lead only to the cynic disappointments visible in second wave scholarship on 
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religion and the internet.  This dilemma ties time to distance. Mitchell’s talking about 
films about biocyber activity is not talking about biocyber activity itself. The broad 
argument of my thesis is that digital images (like those of Second Life) allow for a new 
mode of being. Recognition of interactivity within the image is essential to theoretically 
picturing these new images in this way. Mitchell’s describing films that depict this type 
of interactivity avoid engagement with the foundational aspects of new media. Mitchell’s 
metapicture is one step removed, at a distance.  
 In a section entitled “The Age of Biocybernetic Reproduction” in his essay 
Dinosaurs and Modernity (Clarke and Henderson 351) Mitchell reveals why he has 
chosen to avoid images of the internet.  Reasoning is tied up in his most violent attack 
against digital images: “The internet is hailed as the gateway to a new dimension of 
experience called cyberspace, and virtual reality beckons as the replacement for the 
mundane realm of modernity. But anyone who has spent much time in these new 
dimensions quickly discovers just how disappointing and banal most of them still are. VR 
turns out to be an extension of the penny arcade or the home shopping network, and 
Internet pornography turns out to be about as interesting as the graffiti in a public toilet. 
The grand convergence of computers with biology leads, not to a new age of human 
possibilities, but to the high-tech fulfillment of a Victorian fantasy, a dinosaur theme 
park” (Clarke and Henderson 363).   
 These comments require some context, a picture of Mitchell’s materiality. 
Originally published in 1998, this aggressive language reacts to fledgling representations 
within a digital-graphical medium. Concurrent with second wave research, they share 
many of the same disappointments. While Mitchell’s colorful description remains 
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without examples, his disappointment echoes O’Leary’s description of various online 
rituals some three years later: “The texts and conversations are presented with fancier and 
more colorful graphics, but there are no sound files, no three-dimensional graphics, and 
no attempts to use the more advanced capabilities provided by Java applets, Flash 
animations, or video in any format…The virtual sanctuary displays a variety of iconic 
Christian images with a repeating animated loop of a burning flame; it does not attempt 
to simulate the sacred space of an actual altar of sanctuary”(Hojsgaard and Warburg 39-
41).The interpretive difference between the two is that O’Leary can see the possibility 
and Mitchell cannot.  
  Mitchell judges these images “disappointing and banal.” He most closely relates 
virtual reality to consumerism and human waste, seeing only trite amusements. His 
valuation is voiced out of a gulf between fantastic expectations and disappointment. “… 
[T]he world of biocybernetic reproduction is for most people an imaginary, utopian, 
fictional place. It is not an immediate everyday experiential reality in the same way that 
the innovations of mechanical reproduction (assembly lines, automobiles, telephones, and 
movies) were in the modern era” (What Do Pictures Want 363). From this orientation, 
Mitchell’s foray into virtual reality is destined to disappoint. First treated as a fantasy or 
utopia and consequently exposed as reality, virtual reality necessarily fails expectations. 
Mitchell assessment of virtual reality (in this early treatise on biocybernetic reproduction) 
deals in first in the fantasy and later the reality. The criterion is utopian: “Computers are 
routinely marketed with all the rhetoric of revolutionary modernism, as if they were a 
technical innovation as profound as the invention of printing…” . Mitchell’s projection of 
reality is underwhelming: “… But for most people, computers are simply speeded up 
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extensions of the type writer, the ledger book, the mail box and the filing cabinet”( What 
Do Pictures Want 363). 
  I see two ways of refuting Mitchell’s picture of digital media. The first argument: 
it is simply outdated. Mitchell’s assessment is premature and the present realities of 
digital media do meet more of these fantastic expectations.  This stance involves making 
distinctions between Mitchell’s moment and the present concerning computing power, 
graphic capabilities and defending across the line new manifestations of digital-graphical 
technologies. This form works to a certain extent. Mitchell’s depiction of the human 
interaction with technology is both too broad and too negative. At the present moment 
“for most people” (a term I graft from Mitchell with precaution) personal computing goes 
beyond accelerating older media forms. New means of processing data and applications 
for displaying that data foundationally shift how text is received. Beyond speed, new 
media reformats information. Since 1998 when Mitchell compared the internet to the 
penny arcade, there indeed have been leaps made in the advancement of graphical 
possibilities.
15
 So, arguing against Mitchell from a technical standpoint has its victories. 
However, they are limited by the reactive and defensive position of the rebuttal.  The 
thrust of the argument accelerates out of a retained belief in a biocybernetic utopia. 
Within this argument rests a hold out for a utopian future. Punching from its heels, this 
temporally positioned defense itself becomes perpetually outdated as new forms of image 
reproduction come to life. 
 The second way to resist Mitchell’s picture of digital mediums: question his 
theoretical expectations. Question both the functional and performative expectations 
Mitchell has of biocybernetically reproduced media. What is new media supposed to do 
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and how? How is it the same or different than ‘old’ media? Taken that these questions 
form the beginning of Mitchell’s theses on “biocybernetic reproduction”, I suggest 
challenging them. Much like those posed by Herring and Dawson, these fundamental 
questions reorient expectations of media. Once refocused around these questions, the 
clarified picture of digital media becomes more useful. This reorientation is in the spirit 
of Mitchell’s vernacular mode of picturing theory. The recognition that new media 
functions differently than ‘old’ media is central to a theory of new media and the study of 
religion online. Such a path of inquiry requires wrestling with Mitchell’s inspiration for 
declaring “The Age of Biocybernetic Reproduction”, taken from Walter Benjamin’s “The 
Work of Art in The Age of Mechanical Reproduction”. Mitchell initially distinguishes his 
model from the formative Benjamin: “It is tempting to simply adopt Benjamin’s model of 
technological determination and apply it to explain the dominant tendencies of 
contemporary culture. We live, it is often said, in the period of DNA and the computer. 
Dramatic as the discovery of nuclear energy was, it was really only a quantitative 
extension of the age of energy – the development of a bigger productive and destructive 
force. Having passed the end of the twentieth century, however, it is clear that biology 
has replaced physics as the frontier of science, and that computers and artificial 
intelligence constitute the frontier of technology. We could call this, then, the age of 
biocybernetic reproduction to reflect he double wave of scientific – technical innovations 
that have carried is beyond the machine and assembly line, and beyond the mechanically 
reproduces images of photography and cinema” (Clarke and Henderson 362).  
 The heart of my present thesis is a re-reading of Walter Benjamin’s “Work of 
Art…” against Mitchell’s interpretation of the text as a means of accessing a visual way 
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of being. Considering this essay’s foundational position in Mitchell’s view of digital 
mediums, taking a close look shifts expectant conclusions about biocybernetic (or new) 
media. The next section of this essay closely engages the language of Benjamin and 
Mitchell, charting the reading of Benjamin’s essay presented in the fifteenth chapter of 
What Do Pictures Want?.  Critical analysis of both texts presents the opportunity to 
inform the tension between them with material observations of the digital media in 
question. Images of Second Life serve as the exemplar of the broader graphical nature of 
digital media. (I do not intend to exclude other forms of digital mediation through the use 
of these images, but only wish to provide a vibrant example of contemporary visual 
practices in digital mediums.) These images will work to present my own interpretation 
of Benjamin’s essay in the light of new media. Born out of this infused re-reading is a 
new way of using picture theory, to “see” religion online in opposition to Mitchell’s 
picturing of the digital image as “disappointing” and “banal” (Clarke and Henderson 363). 
 Before beginning a close reading, I would like to quickly and broadly oppose two 
assertions Mitchell makes while framing biocybernetic reproduction. The first is the 
complete transplantation of the biocybernetic for the mechanical: “I will state it as a bald 
proposition then, that biocybernetic reproduction has replaced Walter Benjamin’s 
mechanical reproduction as the fundamental technical determinant of our age” (What Do 
Pictures Want 318). Mitchell tempers this claim by debating the translation of 
“mechanical” versus “technical”, but his replacement of one mode for the other is 
essentially complete. I argue that the turn back to the material that Mitchell observes  and 
the resilient formatting of the mechanical age (keyboards, turning e-book “pages”, web 
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page “road-signs”) indicate an integration of the mechanical with the cyber.
 16
 
Mechanical means of reproduction have not been completely abandoned as Mitchell 
would assert, nor has the influence of the mechanical age ceased to be felt in new 
technologies.   
 The second sweeping claim I broadly resist is that the age of DNA, of biology 
rather than physics, is upon us. Mitchell’s theoretical affiliation with genetics begins with 
Raymound Bellour’s model of new media as a double helix of signs and sensations. The 
idea being that “…the word-image dialectic seems to be reappearing at the level of life 
processes themselves”( What Do Pictures Want 315). Images from Jurassic Park become 
the metapicture of this phenomenon, images of genetic code projected on the visage of a 
genetically engineered dinosaur. Mitchell believes the ‘coding’ of DNA and the ‘coding’ 
of computers are natural affiliates, representing the images of the present moment: 
“Anyone who has read science historian Donna Haraway on cyborgs or watched science 
fiction movies over the last twenty year cannot fail to be struck by the pervasiness of this 
theme”( What Do Pictures Want 316). While I cannot refute the presence of such images, 
I am wary of investing in genetics as the model of the digital image. Bellour makes for an 
easy progression of Mitchell’s bio-cyber relationship. I caution against Mitchell’s full 
acceptance of this framework. W.J.T Mitchell’s use of genetics as a model of the moment 
and his reading of Benjamin under appreciate the reality of digital images in situated 
practice.  
 Mitchell’s appropriation of Benjamin’s essay arrives out of these assumptions. 
Built on a pretense of the disappeared mechanical and an adoration of the genetic model, 
the reading of “The Work of Art…” argued for in What Do Pictures Want? misrepresents 
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realized expectations of new media and digital images. The sort of changes observed as 
biocybernetic media are not taking place in practice. While Mitchell declares the death of 
mechanical reproduction, his critique of Benjamin’s essay remains steeped in the 
vernacular of mechanically reproduced media (film, painting, sculpture). Basing its rubric 
in older media, his assessment poorly gauges the transformative properties of digital 
media. Rather than engaged cartography of new media and its possibilities, W.J.T. 
Mitchell’s reading is cursory. I reengage Walter Benjamin’s essay with digital media 
through a critique of Mitchell’s challenges to the text. Like Mitchell, I agree that “[i]f we 
pursue the question in the spirit of Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction” then every term needs to be re-examined”( What Do Pictures 
Want 318). It is the mode of re-examination I find unsatisfying.   
 Mitchell distinguishes his mode of biocybernetic reproduction from Benjamin’s 
mechanical reproduction by way of three parallel changes: “[f]irst, the copy is no longer 
an inferior of decayed relic of the original, but is in principle an improvement on the 
original; second, the relation between the artist and the work, the work and its model, is 
both more distant and more intimate than anything possible the realm of mechanical 
reproduction; and third, a new temporality, characterized by an erosion of the event and a 
deepening the relevant past, produces a peculiar sense of  ‘accelerated stasis’ in our sense 
of history”( What Do Pictures Want 319). I would like to simplify these distinctions into 
three questions of authenticity, spatiality and temporality. Mitchell bases his reading 
around these changes.  Authenticity, spatiality and temporality meet thematically in the 
study of religion online. Authenticity is discussed in terms of identity, ritual efficacy and 
authority. Spatiality surrounds questions of presence, bodies, and architecture. 
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Temporality determines interaction and reinforces authenticity, agency and identity. 
Mitchell’s questions of new media are identifiable as questions for religious practice in 
new media. Themes identified in the surveying beginnings of this essay appear in the 
language of Mitchell and Benjamin. Authenticity, spatiality and temporality are pivotal in 
establishing relationships between picture theory and religious practice online. 
Navigating these three channels between Mitchell, Benjamin and observations of Second 
Life charts a picture of visual being in a digital medium.  
 The original image, the copy, and ultimately aura make up the first constellation 
of concerns - authenticity as a value of the image. Benjamin begins discussing 
authenticity as a unique condition of location: “This unique existence of the work of art 
determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence 
(Benjamin 220). As Joel Snyder notes “[t]hus, the original had the power to “pull” art 
lovers to the museum or collection in which it was housed”(Snyder 162). This located 
history escapes reproduction. This sense of distance goes beyond spatiality: “…the 
unique phenomena of distance, however close it may be” (Benjamin 222). Plate describes 
this as “…a metaphysical distance from an object even though it may be physically 
close” (Plate 88). Walter Benjamin arrives at aura to describe this accumulated sense of 
history and distance perceived in the work of art. “The authenticity of a thing is the 
essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive 
duration to its testimony to the history to which is has experienced”(Benjamin 221).  
 Visual Studies broadens the definitional boundaries of ‘art’, which can retain an 
aura, into the context of images, concerning itself with everyday seeing and showing. 
This broader field of study includes digitally produced or reproduced images. Boundaries 
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of aura come under new mediation. Without attempting a (re)definition of aura, I will 
expose Mitchell’s manipulation of the term within the vernacular of new media, followed 
by a reading of Benjamin’s language into the picture of the avatar in an attempt to chart 
these boundaries. “Benjamin famously argued that the advent of photographic copies was 
producing a ‘decay of the aura’ – a loss of the unique presence, authority, and mystique 
of the original object”( What Do Pictures Want 319).  This conception of aura begins 
Mitchell’s evaluation of its viability within new media. “Now we have to say that the 
copy has, is anything, even more aura than the original. More precisely, in a world where 
the very idea of the unique original seems a merely nominal or legal fiction, the copy has 
every chance of being an improvement or enhancement of whatever counts as the 
original” (What Do Pictures Want 320).  
 The “world” where the possibility of the original is in question is a postmodern 
one, beyond the scope of Benjamin. It is a world of contested subject/object relations, the 
circuitous world of French thinkers caught between pincers of image and text.(Picture 
Theory 315). It is also the world of copyright reformation, where it is questioned whether 
one can own a piece of data, and image or a sound. Inhabiting this world are what Sherry 
Turkle labels the “custodians of doubt” (Turkle 5) those who are cautiously hopeful about 
the possibilities of new technologies. 
 Aura for Mitchell is a manipulable property: “Photographs of artworks can be 
‘scrubbed’ to remove flaws and dust; in principle, the effects of aging in an oil painting 
could be digitally erased, and the work restored its pristine originality in a reproduction. 
Of course this would still constitute a loss of the aura that Benjamin associated with the 
accretion of history and tradition around an object; but if aura means recovering the 
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original vitality, literally, the ‘breath’ of the life of the original, then the digital copy can 
come closer to looking and sounding like the original than the original itself” (What Do 
Pictures Want 320). Etymology usurps Benjamin’s nuanced term. Mitchell chooses 
Benjamin’s terminology rather than meaning for support. This act diminishes the 
importance of the historical testimony of an image as a determinant of aura. The 
possibility of duration within the digital goes largely unaddressed by Mitchell.
17
 Aura 
instead becomes a recoverable dimension of an image. “Pristine” replaces historic. 
Vitality replaces aura. These foundational shifts in the meaning of aura are the product of 
Mitchell’s re-examination of every term within Benjamin’s work (What Do Pictures 
Want 318). I would like to sound this altered language against Benjamin’s original text. 
Dissonance between these definitional boundaries creates a third space for compromise. 
Bringing images and practices from digital media into this space, I work to create a 
situated reflection on aura in new media. 
 Building his journey towards a sense of aura, Benjamin solidifies the necessity 
for unique presence: “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in 
one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it 
happens to be” (Benjamin 220). Benjamin stresses the physical situation of the original 
image. It has a unique physical location. “This unique existence of the work of art 
determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence” 
(Benjamin 220). History physically impacts the image - as scars, rust, rot and evaporation. 
Both Benjamin and Mitchell acknowledge the materiality of history. Both recognize a 
relationship between originality and physicality.  The ways in which mechanical 
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processes are gathered around the image by Benjamin and Mitchell reveal divergent 
investments in this aging process. For Benjamin, physical changes to a work of art 
“…can be revealed only by chemical or physical analyses which it is impossible to 
perform on a reproduction…” (Benjamin 220).  The apparatus that surround the image 
reveal an authenticity built of history. These physical and chemical processes help unveil 
the history of an image. For Benjamin, “[t]he whole sphere of authenticity is outside the 
technical – and of course, not only technical – reproducibility” (Benjamin 220).  In 
contrast, Mitchell argues that an image’s originality is achieved through technical means. 
By digitally “scrubbing” away its imperfections, by effectively removing any trace of 
history, “…the work is restored to its pristine originality in a reproduction” (What Do 
Pictures Want 320). In this case, traces of history impede originality and (arguably) 
potential aura.  Originality for Mitchell is a-historic, concerned with a “pristine” (What 
Do Pictures Want 320) image rather than a persistent picture. 
 These polarized sets of relations between history and authenticity problematize 
technical distinctions between a “work of art” and an “image.” I use the terms “work of 
art” and “picture” here interchangeably, as both are materially determined. Broadly 
speaking, a picture is materially bound, an image not so. From Mitchell’s foundational 
difference, a particular work of art is a necessarily a picture, a “…constructed concrete 
object or ensemble (frame, support, materials, pigments, facture)…” (Picture Theory 4). 
Individual works of art are discrete pictures situated spatially and temporally. 
Pictures/works are subject to physical impacts of history. Benjamin’s accumulated and 
authentic history is concerned with such pictures and such physical impact (Benjamin 
220). Authenticity is established partially through the material condition of a picture 
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subject to a unique history. Observing differences between authentic pictures and 
reproductions takes place at a material level. Here is the dust, scratch, rust etc… Mitchell 
broadens the scope of authenticity beyond materiality by valuing images within an a-
historical context. The reproductions “scrubbed” of imperfections are concrete depictions 
both spatially and temporally bound (in this instance, as an image file in Photoshop). 
These works are pictures. Mitchell is suggesting that the material state of these pictures 
can affect the aura of the original image: “…the digital copy can come closer to looking 
and sounding like the original than the original itself”( What Do Pictures Want 320). 
Reaching back across time, digital technologies change the state of original images, 
argues Mitchell. Distinctions between Benjamin’s original “work of art” (a picture) and 
Mitchell’s original “image” (a representation not materially bound) come into question. I 
suggest that, for Mitchell, the unbound image has replaced the material work of art as the 
“original” or “authentic”. Benjamin’s original work of art was historically bound and 
inherently distant. In Mitchell’s picture of digital media, the originality of the image is 
achievable (and surpassable). What is being perfected and reclaimed through digital 
manipulation is not the condition of the original picture but the original image. For 
example, if one were digitally restoring a damaged photographic portrait, the goal would 
be a more authentic image as opposed to a more authentic picture. The achievement 
would a truer representation of the subject, not the medium. The attempt is not at a better 
picture (photograph) but a better image (subject). The unbound image becomes accessible 
through digital manipulation.  
  Fractures between Benjamin and Mitchell on the fault line of picture and image 
reveal changed delineations of authenticity and the accessibility of aura. Aura remains a 
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property of the authentic and the original, though its historical ties are severed by 
Mitchell. Benjamin’s properties of “the original” are transferred from the work of art (the 
picture) to the living, breathing, desiring image. Questions of “value” became those of 
“vitality” under picture theory. So too with aura: aura becomes an indication of life. Aura 
expresses the vitality of living images, the “…”breath” of life of the original” (What Do 
Pictures Want 320). Mitchell’s sense of aura is immediate, accessible and manipulable.  I 
suggest that by asking questions of the living images that go unasked by Mitchell one can 
accept the immediacy of Mitchell’s aura while maintaining Benjamin’s importance of 
history. By reorienting the expectations of new media away from those of so-called old 
media, and speaking within the social vernacular of individuals’ interactions within 
digital images, this question of authenticity becomes one of identity. Shifting this query 
brings the living image out of the metaphorical.  
 Avatars
18
 are the living visual-representations of unique selves within digital 
media. Richard A. Bartle’s opus on designing virtual worlds suggests a number of ways 
of thinking through the avatar: “They are tangible entities within the virtual world, as real 
(to it) as any other object. As representations of sentient beings, they have attributes and 
skills; however, they have other functionality merely by their virtue of being objects. 
From this point of view the virtual body is a machine that the character lives in” (Bartles 
384).
19
Each avatar is a situated picture of the user. To think of the avatar as the picture of 
anything, it resembles the portrait.
20
 Avatars within Second Life are animated, moving 
(walking, flying) through the virtual world.
21
  Avatars exceed animation. Their vitality 
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goes beyond movement. The life of the avatar is tied through distance and history to the 
user. History and physicality give evidence to authenticity (Benjamin 220). Through 
Mitchell’s assessment of new media the subject of history shifts from picture to image. 
Avatars (as the objects of images) are not dependent upon their own physical duration for 
historical testimony. As unique living portraits of individuals, history of the picture of the 
avatar is tied to its original image, the user. Historical testimony resides in the individual 
behind the avatar. As animated avatars move through space, they carry with them a 
personal history.
22
This historical identity of the image is possible by way of the 
networked means of new media. It is both immediate and historical, satisfying both 
Mitchell and Benjamin’s picture of aura. Acknowledging this interactive aura goes 
beyond Mitchell’s willingness to theorize new media in new terms. 
 Observing the historical interactive aura of avatars requires changed expectations 
of media. Walter Benjamin, in comparing film to the stage, marks different potentials for 
aura: “…for the first time – and this is the effect of film, man has to operate with his 
whole living person, yet forgoing its aura. For aura is tied to his presence; there can be no 
replica of it. The aura which, on the stage, emanates from Macbeth cannot be separated 
for the spectators from that of the actor. However, the singularity of the shot in the studio 
is that the camera is substituted for the public. Consequently, the aura that envelops the 
actor vanishes, and with it the aura of the figure he portrays” (Benjamin 229).  Benjamin 
divides his expectations for the persistence of aura between two mediums. Stage and film 
have different potentials for retaining aura. The aura of the stage actor, present in the 
same space as the audience, is perceptible. The aura of the film actor, separated from the 
audience through the reproductive media of film, is lost. For the avatar, the authenticity, 
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originality, history and aura of the image are not recovered through “scrubbing” or exact 
digital replication, but retained by new media’s ability to facilitate immediate 
interactivity. Aura’s presence within the avatar as picture of user is  perceivable. To 
rework the quoted language of Benjamin: …for the first time – and this is the effect of 
digital images – humanity can operate with its whole living person (within a medium), 
and retain its aura.  
 Holding aside some questions of authentic performances of identity that plague 
the academic study of religion online, the possibility of aura through digital mediation 
represents a new humanity through apparatus. The shooting of a film, notes Benjamin, 
“affords a spectacle unimaginable anywhere at anytime before this” (Benjamin 232).  
Film cameras represent a tyrannical division between the self and the aura, the worker 
and the product, the person and the prayer. (Benjamin 231). Benjamin sees an actor 
stripped of aura, temporality and spatiality shattered, divided and pulled apart across 
miles of screen real-estate. The task and the struggle of an actor in this circumstance 
(where mechanical intervention works to rend aura from body), is to retain a whole sense 
of humanity in the face of the apparatus. As humanity engages with film, reality becomes 
a secondary process of editing. The reality taking place in a film is an illusion, a result of 
an editing process that removes any sign of the apparatus involved in the production of 
these images. “That is to say, in the studio the mechanical equipment has penetrated so 
deeply into reality that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of equipment is 
the result of a special procedure…”(Benjamin 233). This “pure aspect” is the illusion of 
reality. As a result, “[t]he equipment-free aspect of reality here as become the height of 
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artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology” 
(Benjamin 233).   
 Mechanically induced realities of film involve constant intervention by 
technologic appendages, holding up an illusion of authenticity. Benjamin observed a 
deliberate attempt to hide these appendages through means of editing. New technologies, 
new media and new means of representation account for and illustrate these apparatuses 
without illusion.
23
  Within the digital world of Second Life, the apparatus is presented 
through the medium of interaction. The computer (the means of reproduction), 
specifically in this case the keyboard, is acknowledged as present in the mediation of the 
image/text that is the avatar. As one avatar chats to another through text, the avatar 
onscreen mimics a typing movement in the air, to indicate that the user is typing. Thus, 
during sermons or prayers or orations that take place (like those in the Anglican 
Cathedral of Second Life) the visibility of the apparatus and the acknowledgement of 
mechanical intervention are apparent. More, the screen which contains the picture of the 
avatar is also filled with the screens, logs and notifications of all internet based mediums. 
The apparatus is apparent. 
 Mitchell argued for an integration of the bios and the cyber, a dissolving boundary 
between organic and mechanic. The coming of the biocyber marks a relinquishing of 
humanity to the apparatus. It seems, to the contrary, that preserving a sense of humanity 
in the face of the apparatus is less challenging (or at least less anxiety producing) than in 
the mechanical age. Old media and new media generate or invite different reactions as 
apparatus. Film cameras, printing presses, and reel-to-reel audio are the steaming, 
clanking, lumbering dinosaurs of a medium’s imposition. Like the animatronic dinosaurs 
                                                 
23
 For more on modern art and the apparent apparatus, see What Do Pictures Want 111 
 
50 
of Mitchell’s exemplar Jurassic Park these reproductive machines are physically 
imposing, mechanically manipulative brutes. Old media technologies sit in opposition to 
humanity, as something foreign, dictating perception. New technologies of new media 
feed a sense of humanity, a sense of immediacy, and a sense of interaction. Ergonomic 
computer keyboards and mice, intuitive, tactile touch screens and honestly 
anthropomorphic avatars all invest in a familiarity with the human body. There is little 
left of the mechanical resistance that could be found in a jammed press or a wound 
camera reel.  
 Talk of mechanical resistance, immediacy, and interaction along with the 
presence of the apparatus begins a conversation surrounding Mitchell’s final two 
reinterpretations of Benjamin’s language concerning spatiality and temporality. Through 
this analysis a new vocabulary of new media, as woven through observation and 
exemplars, is uprooted and unveiled. Bouncing between Mitchell and Benjamin, this 
vocabulary illuminates a new visual ontology of new media. Immediately interactive 
interfaces do not mask their moving parts. There is neither a denial of the apparatus, nor 
an overwhelming acceptance of it into the body as some sort of cyborgs, but an 
acknowledgment of its constant presence, a congenial, parallel existence of both bios and 
cyber. Anxieties expressed by Mitchell result from misplaced expectations and a failing 
vocabulary of old media. Mitchell begins his discussion of spatiality and temporality by 
recasting two players in Benjamin’s theatre of the mechanically reproduced: the 
cameraman and the surgeon. Comparing actors through different mediums, Benjamin 
places on his stage the painter, the cameraman, the magician and the surgeon.  
Surrounding the body as a medium, the surgeon and the cameraman mark the extremes of 
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distance: “[t]he magician heals a sick person by the laying on of hands; the surgeon cuts 
into the patient’s body” (Benjamin 233). Surrounding images as a medium
24
, the painter 
stands in for the magician, the cameraman for the surgeon: “[t]he painter maintains in his 
work a natural distance from reality, the cameraman penetrates deeply into its web” 
(Benjamin 233). Inviting inquiry into both temporal and spatial relations, these parallels 
posited by Benjamin are re-mediated by Mitchell: “The cameraman is replaced by the 
designer of virtual spaces and electronic architectures, and the surgeon adopts new 
techniques of remote, virtual surgery” (What Do Pictures Want 321). Mitchell attempts to 
bring Benjamin’s actors into new means of reproduction. 
 This is the only time that Mitchell mentions virtual worlds or architectures within 
this discussion, and does so with little elaboration or nuance. Instead, Mitchell is carried 
off by the virtual surgeon into a discussion of the performance artist Stelarc.
25
 Lack of 
engagement with located aspects of new media is symptomatic of Mitchell’s disoriented 
expectations. This parallel tract of the cameraman and the virtual designer is provocative, 
but unexplored, interesting but underdeveloped. I would like to work some of this 
language through, in the spirit of Mitchell’s intentions. What Mitchell is suggesting is 
that the cameraman, the interrogator of reality, has been replaced by the virtual architect. 
Mitchell sees that both determine the vision (or the visible) of reality. The cameraman 
and the virtual architect both control that which is seen and how. The penetrating
26
 
operator of the mechanical apparatus manipulates reality, determining its visible scope. 
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While this is an accurate interpretation of Benjamin’s meaning, Mitchell’s depiction of 
virtual space is incomplete.  
 Mitchell does not recognize the user as part of the population of the new media 
aesthetic habitat. Though justifying the re-reading of Mitchell’s simple sentence is 
difficult, perhaps that it is only a single sentence indicates Mitchell’s unwillingness to 
engage with the realities of new media and his turn instead to the familiar halls of the art 
gallery. Pushing against Mitchell, I would argue that the cameraman has been replaced by 
the user, by the avatar. Users determine how their environment is seen, as each 
movement is like the movement of a camera. Within Second Life, switching from an 
over-the-shoulder third person perspective to a point -of-view first person perspective 
involves clicking on a small ‘camera’ icon. In this case, the avatars eyes literally become 
camera lenses; the avatar becomes a camera-man hybrid. It is in this same way that the 
images of an individual on their Facebook page can be curated in such a way as to project 
the desired personality. The user determines how they are seen, within the confines of a 
coded and prescribed system. Coding and regulating the media through which these 
images are seen is done by hardware and software designers. These “virtual architects”
27
 
are less cameramen and more director, screenwriter, or producer. They create the medium, 
or at least the rules of the medium.  
 Beyond Mitchell’s misreading of the passage on the cameraman/painter problem, 
some of Benjamin’s language on spatial-temporal relations of humanity to media is left 
out of Mitchell’s discussion. Interrogating this language draws a more accurate picture of 
visual being in digital media. The first passage concerns the “mobile mirror”, and the 
estrangement of the individual from his own image: “The feeling of strangeness that 
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overcomes the actor before the camera, as Pirandello describes it, is basically of the same 
kind as the estrangement felt before one’s own image in the mirror. But now the reflected 
image has become separable, transportable. And where is it transported? Before the 
public. Never for a moment does the screen actor cease to be conscious of this fact” 
(Benjamin 231). In this way, we have all
28
 become screen actors, conscious of our 
presence to a mass public. Through the avatar and programs like Chat Roulette, Facebook 
and Twitter, our visual being is visible to the public. The user is a public figure in the 
social environment that is digital media.  
 The mobile mirror of online worlds creates a means of mass participation. 
Conceiving new means of mass participation leads to the second passage unaddressed by 
Mitchell: “The mass is a matrix from which all traditional behavior toward works of art 
issues today in a new form. Quantity has been transmuted into quality. The greatly 
increased mass of participants has produced a change in the modes of participation” 
(Benjamin 239). Benjamin is referring to art breaking out of the gallery and onto Main 
Street, breaking out of the frame and arriving on celluloid, on screen. By way of film the 
masses observe, debate, and participate in art in ways that were previously unknown. 
New media has created changes in modes of participation that go beyond Benjamin’s 
conceptions of the “mass” of film.  
 “Mass media” has less now to do with distribution and more to do with 
participation. Movie-goers, participating by way of observing the images in a new 
community of public art, were essentially still consumers, locked out of the mechanical 
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processes of film production.
29
 Means of participation were means of consumption. The 
success of websites is determined by unique users, new visitors. Second Life’s interface 
gives access to these numbers readily. The popularity of a certain location within the 
virtual world is gauged by its “traffic” - the movement within the designated virtual space. 
Unique user traffic measures interaction and engagement, manipulation rather than 
consumption. Interactivity and an agency of images foster mass participation in visual 
environments on a global scale, facilitating a means of interaction beyond the scope of 
the mechanically reproduced film. Mass participation in new media is being the living 
image, participating in a visual ontology. Mass participation is participation in the social 
environment of the living image.  
 Re-reading Benjamin through Mitchell around three issues pressing on both visual 
studies and the study of religion online offers possibilities for moving forward a theory of 
visual ontology. Translating Benjamin and Mitchell into the vernacular of visual being 
lends a few conclusions. Benjamin’s aura, originally concerned with the “unique 
existence of a work of art” (Benjamin 220), becomes a property of vitality rather than a 
property of history. The avatar, as a portrait of the user, retains and expresses a historical 
continuity, an interactive originality and vitality that is congruent with Benjamin’s 
necessity for the historically bound aura.  Using this reading of aura rather than 
Mitchell’s “scrubbed” and manipulated digital image is a more honest and authentic 
reading of the text. Moving forward with a concept of aura in new media requires an 
understanding of its historically bound interactive nature. Understanding the avatar as a 
type of portrait of the user is a way of bridging Benjamin’s appreciation of the portrait as 
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the last stronghold of authenticity and the new way digital media allows for the living 
image to be understood. Understanding the living, breathing portrait of the user as the 
avatar shifts Mitchell’s expectations of new media. Moving beyond the lumbering 
apparatus of old media, new media moves beyond the metaphor of the living image, and 
the human relationship to the technologies of new media evolves.  
 The means through which humanity is maintained in the face of the apparatus, a 
chief concern of Benjamin’s, have shifted. Mechanical resistance and intervention have 
abated, and the illusionary practices of film editing replaced by an appreciative 
acceptance of the technologies that are a new social network of images. Reality within 
the participatory field of media is no longer an illusion. While this appreciative 
acceptance does not go so far as to validate Mitchell’s claim for the biocyber, it does 
reconfigure the human-media relationship. Reconfiguration takes place on a visual 
spectrum, a visible plane. The spatial and temporal relationship of the human to the 
apparatus, while indicative of the authenticity of the image, also fosters a visual 
immediacy, an agency within images. The moveable avatar, the manipulable profile 
picture, and the “hash-tagged”
30
 twitter picture all exercise a visual-textual field that is 
redefining experience in media.  The moveable mirror allows for the mass participation in 
a new visual community.  
 Thus W.J.T. Mitchell’s picture is changed. Gone are the cyborgs depicted in film, 
the old media attempt at capturing the new. The biocybernetic obsession of the 
performance and gallery artists mentioned in Mitchell’s piece are replaced by the located 
practices of peoples participating in digital mediums. Mitchell’s methodology remains 
                                                 
30
 “hash-tagging” is the insertion of the symbol “#” in front of a piece of text to index it amongst other 
participants 
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foundational to my approach however. The figure of the image/text, the living image and 
the media as social habitat all remain fruitful ways of illustrating visual ontology. 
Scholarship on religion online in the present so-called “fourth wave” has perpetually been 
claiming to locate theory, discrete methodologies and typologies. Connelly’s essay on 
Buddhist practices in Second Life (Campbell 2013) is a fine example of how such 
scholarship falls short of its own expectations. I don’t mean to imply that this work is not 
valuable. It is worth reading as a survey of the experience of practicing religion in my 
chosen exemplary space. However, the language of this essay (and many like it) does not 
engage seriously with the presentation of the medium through which this practice is 
taking place, the images. 
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TOWARDS A VISUAL ONTOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Image by Author. 
 
Thus I introduce my own metapicture of iconological ontology in religious practice. The 
above picture is a medium for picturing theory, makes up the vernacular vocabulary. The 
section below begins a conversation between my re-reading of Benjamin and the visual 
language offered by Second Life. Before addressing how it helps “picture” the theory 
discussed up to this point, I will quickly sort through the broad context for this image. 
This image was captured on March 7, 2013 in the Anglican Cathedral of Second Life, on 
Epiphany Island. The Island also contains a smaller chapel, the offices of the presiding 
church officials, and a prayer garden that flits with the perpetual movement of animated 
birds, butterflies and rabbits.  The cathedral and island are free and accessible to anyone. 
Founded in 2006 the cathedral was constructed across two months in 2007. From it’s 
website: “Anglican worship services are held daily on Epiphany Island, both in the 
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cathedral and in our smaller meditation chapel.  A weekly bible study is held on Sunday 
mornings, with more courses and discussion groups in the planning stages” (“About the 
Cathedral”). The cathedral is under the authority of Christopher Hill, Bishop of Guilford, 
England. Hill has written an essay on the theological consequences of the conducting 
Anglican services within Second Life (Hill). Hill excludes practices such as communion 
and baptism from the church, the disembodied nature of these virtual spaces making 
certain rituals impossible. Such exclusion speaks to a continued separation of the bios and 
the cyber, and yet the attention to such matters, a theological wrestling with the visual 
nature of the space, supports a concept of a visual ontology that participates in meaning-
making
31
. 
 My chosen metapicture displays my avatar standing in the cathedral, reaching out 
to interact with a text entitled “Service Sheet”. As my avatar reaches out to the object, 
small dots of light commute between its hand and the text, visually indicating an 
interaction. As the light travels, the text from the service sheet is transferred to my 
inventory, available to be read. Texts are accessible to anyone who visits the cathedral, 
including one labeled “Cathedral Gestures”, that, when touched, allows the user to 
download specific movement to be enacted by their avatar within the cathedral.  
 Mitchell’s device of the metapicture visualizes theoretical distinctions made 
throughout this thesis, while staying within a visual (or “picturing”) framework. This 
image from Second Life is the social vernacular of a visual way of being religious. 
Talking through this picture folds together the foundational aspects of visual ontology 
discussed. It pictures the living or personified image of the avatar (unfortunately, 
animation and interaction escape the medium of the printed page). The metapicture 
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 The term “meaning-making” is adaptation of Stewart Hoovers language 
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illustrates media as both habitat and architecture, the digital as both projecting and 
enacting a social environment. Pictured most acutely is the imagetext, the tactile 
relationship with text taking place through visual mediation. What makes it a meta-
picture, a picture of the digital picture, is the visibility of the apparatus, the acceptance 
and appearance of the medium. The tension between living individual, architecture, 
habitual media, image and text are all highly visible. 
 The metapicture demands my changed questions of Mitchell’s living image. As 
the image comes alive, its needs increase. Mitchell moves the question of power to one of 
desire. A living image is no longer objectified through a valuation of its ability to 
influence the viewer. A living image becomes subject of its own desires. A question of 
value becomes one of vitality. Images are valuated on their viability, their potential to ‘go 
on’ or ‘go before’ to regenerate or spread virally. What does the living image of the 
avatar desire? Is it viable? How does augmenting these questions help better understand 
the avatar as a new type of living? Considering the aesthetic digital media, in this case the 
avatar, the concept of a “living image” is no longer itself an image, it becomes a picture, 
becomes framed in new media. The living image is no longer a metaphor. Mitchell would 
argue that his own use of the term was no longer metaphoric, that reference to image as 
bios was literal, situated in social contexts. Mitchell living image is weak. His living 
image is alive as a social agent, as a generative (and regenerative) force. Image and 
pictures that reproduce themselves virally through human beings are very much alive. 
Certainly, however, the lives of images have evolved beyond Mitchell’s conception in 
both Picture Theory and What Do Pictures Want?  
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 The reading of Benjamin offered above supports a claim that the living image has 
evolved from metaphor to situated being within the aesthetic of digital media. Thinking 
through new technologies for the retention of aura, a maintained humanity in the face of 
the apparatus, the mobile mirror, and new modes of mass participation all invigorate a 
changed conception of the living image. These issues parallel primary concerns identified 
in the study of religion online: authenticity, spatiality and temporality, and interactivity. 
Authenticity and identity involve my reconfiguration of new media’s relationship to the 
aura. The vitality of my avatar, of my metapicture, are retained and perceived through 
interactivity that is tied historically to my self as the user of the avatar. A user can operate 
as a whole living person within this medium and retain an aura. Aura is maintained 
through technologies of reproduction that foster human relationships between media and 
self.  The mechanical apparatus that worked in opposition to humanity as described by 
Benjamin have been replaced by the pseudo-symbiotic apparatuses of new media (digital 
worlds, webcams etc...). They allow individuals to “move the mirror” in a way never 
before possible, the living portrait participating in unbounded mass media.  
 New mass-media is the habitat of Mitchell’s living social image. The language 
surrounding new media offers a kaleidoscopic view of media as habitat. The advent of 
the term “social media” begins a shared sense of a communal medium. Terms like virtual 
environment, space and more colloquial terms like “Twitter-sphere” and “home page” all 
give a located sense to new media. Social media accounts for not only its function but its 
form. Social lives of users, as well as the social lives of digital images can be included in 
this discussion of a “social media”. As witnessed above, Mitchell defines media as a 
social institution, containing both individuals and their media practices. Individuals and 
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practices collapse together within the visual social field, most clearly within the image of 
the avatar. Avatars are authentic portraits existing in a social habitat of other living 
images. Avatars serve as the intersection of an individual and their media practices. 
Pushing forward the words of McLuhan, the media is no longer just the message; the 
media is the “me.”
32
  Benjamin argued modes of perception equal modes of existence. 
Existing within the social habitat of embodied images is being visual, a visual ontology. 
 The metapicture of visual ontology above illustrates a particular image-text 
relationship. The picture of the avatar reaching for the book, the animation of dots that 
mediate that interaction, and the implications of this tactile interaction with text all play 
out Mitchell’s concept of the imagetext. This metapicture illustrates elements of 
‘chatting’ that occur between avatars, mediating textual and visual communication. Chat 
occurs in a side window within the screen, as a means of communication. The chat 
window is separated from the body of the avatar within the virtual environment. Avatar’s 
names float above their body, a gap between the body and the label. Similar image-text 
positions are established between Facebook profile pictures and textual status updates 
and Twitter profile pictures and the text of tweets. The image and the text remain related, 
but separate. 
 Dots of light travel between the avatar’s hand and the desired text. As the dots 
traverse the gap between the pictured hand and the pictured book, the text pictured by the 
presence of the book appears in a new window on the user’s screen. Through these 
channels of light, the avatar has revealed the text within the book.  These dots imagine a 
line of communication, making visible systemic aspects of new media. The apparatus of 
communication (the computer coding within Second Life) is visualized in the social 
                                                 
32
 For more on Mitchell’s take on McLuhan see What Do Pictures Want 201 
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habitat of the media environment. The mediation of image and text is visualized. Mitchell 
uses a similar image to illustrate inhabited elements of systemic mediation. Describing 
media as “both a system and an environment” (What Do Pictures Want 210), Mitchell 
utilizes the one vase/two face image.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. (What Do Pictures Want? 211). 
 “The invisible media of seeing and speaking are depicted here as channels of 
intersubjectivity, a kind of emblem of the very process of “addressing media”…the two 
faces address each other simultaneously in what Jacques Lacan would call the “scopic” 
and “vocative” registers …The unmarked ribbon of the oral medium is contrasted to the 
punctuated, subdivided channel of the visual, perhaps to suggest a qualitative difference 
between the scopic and vocative, the pulsations and nervous glances of the optical 
process contrasted with the fluidity of the smooth talker”(What Do Pictures Want 210-
11). Mitchell describes the lines and dots marking the space between the mouth and eyes 
of the unmarked faces. For Mitchell, the lines and dots make visible the very real act of 
mediation, along with the space and form of media facilitating this act.  
 The text image interaction animation within Second Life visualizes similar 
channels of communication. Dots of light travel between the image (avatar) and the text 
 
63 
(book). This animation describes a relation both internal and external to new media. 
Internally, the coding that carries out the interaction is hidden, as are most of the 
mediations in new media. The visual field of operating systems is accessible to most 
users, the textual field of code lies hidden. The hand-to-book animation illuminates this 
opacity, traversing the unmarked space between text and image. Thus the animation of a 
communicative line of dots animates a hidden image-text relation. Externally, the 
animation illustrates fluidity between image and text in new media. The animation 
illustrates a connective tissue between image and text. At the same time, it is 
distinguishing difference. The tactile relationship to the materiality of bound books is 
familiar. Reaching out to a text on a table is familiar. However, within a coded digital 
space this movement between image and text is completely unnecessary. The picture of 
the avatar and the text exist within the same medium. There are a number of ways the text 
could be presented to the user. It is not bound to a material text. It could pop up on screen 
upon entering the church. It could be delivered to the user’s inbox without the animation. 
Without the animation or without the distinction, text and image would blend more 
seamlessly.  However, the designers of Second Life (and in particular the Anglican 
Cathedral) decided to make this mediation of image and text visible.  
 Speaking on a similar image-text relationship, Mitchell begins a conversation 
with Foucault over Magritte’s Les trahison des images (Picture Theory, 65). Magritte’s 
pipe and script call attention to a dialectic between image and text. An example of “…the 
insertion of the picture into a discourse on vision and representation” (65), this image-text 
relationship would be defined by Foucault as a “calligram”. A calligram “brings a text 
and a shape as close together as possible” (65) as image and text mutually attempt to 
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define the subject. Both text and image work to overcome one another as the reigning 
descriptor. Mitchell cites Foucault’s argument for a third space in between the text and 
the image: “On a page of an illustrated book, we seldom pay attention to the small space 
running above the words and below the drawings, forever serving them as a common 
frontier. It is there, on these few millimeters of white, the calm sand of the page, that are 
established all the relations of designation, nomination, description, 
classification”(Picture Theory 69). An infinite number of relations exist within the space 
between image and picture. This gap contains a continuous back and forth between image 
and text, the “multistable”
33
 definitional space of the metapicture. Foucault’s recognition 
of space between text and image (particularly in Magritte’s painting) as the “calm sand of 
the page” (Picture Theory 69) stills a combative binary relationship between image and 
text. For Mitchell, the infinite loop of relations becomes a space of rich description. 
Rather than a pitching battle for power between image and text, Mitchell finds a vibrating, 
living metapicture. This sandy third space is where the hard logos of the land meet the 
fluid and descriptive bios of the sea.
34
 
 Mitchell’s use of Foucault’s image-text relationship (and the resulting third space) 
reflects the image of the living avatar. Mediation between text and image takes place 
within the visual field of new media
35
. This intermediary mediation is visible on 
Facebook newsfeeds and Twitter feeds, as means of communication are between visual 
self and textual expression. The body of the avatar is spatially separated from its textual 
voice, its chat screen. The separation of textual communication (chat) from the graphical 
body of the avatar makes up a Foucauldian “sand” of the page. The space of screen 
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 Mitchell uses “multistable” to define the rhetorical footing of the metapicture. See Picture Theory 45-57 
34
 For more see Mitchell What Do Pictures Want 315 
35
 Remember Mitchell argues that all media is “mixed media” 
 
65 
between the text and the image is where a whole sense of being an imagetext is 
negotiated and maintained. In between the avatar and the communicative text exists a 
gulf, a gap, a sandy stretch of imagetext. Interaction with the authentic living image of 
the avatar requires an intermediary mediation of text and image. Human interaction 
between living avatars takes place on this sandy gulf. A whole sense of being is 
constructed between the body (image) and voice (text) of the avatar.  
 Perceiving the shifting sands of this being assumes a historical continuity. 
Awareness of agency requires a living agent behind the imagetext. The belief that the 
moving, speaking avatar is inhabited by a human agent allows for my redefined sense of 
a vital aura. An avatar’s aura is visible in image-text relations. Facebook status updates, 
Tweets, Instragram captions and Second Life chat-logs all activate a living relationship 
between the image, the text and the user. The mirror moves into a mass media of 
participation, reflecting the portrait of the user into a new media habitat. Knowing that the 
avatar and the text constellate around a user creates a sense of visual being in new media. 
Foucault found in the third space “all the relations of designation, nomination, description, 
classification” (Mitchell 1994, 69). Perhaps it also contains all the vibrations and 
movements of visual ontology: the living image, the habitat of media and the whole 
infinite relation of the imagetext.  
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FINAL THOUGHTS  
 What does picturing a theory of visual ontology accomplish? How does visual 
ontology help in better understanding religious practice online and more broadly being 
online? In working towards a conclusion, I will briefly make some larger connections 
between my metapicture and picture theory before observing intersections between this 
thesis and the study of religion online presently and moving forward. 
 My metapicture speaks in the “immanent vernacular” of digital images. All the 
theoretical work being done can be experienced within its frame. The apparent apparatus 
and the image-text relationship can be seen in the image. Pictorial avatars’ expressive 
mediation between text and image describes a wholeness of human being within digital 
media. Mitchell’s metapicture of the imagetext facilitates an appreciation of this 
existence. What escapes the media of the present printed page is the sense of aura, the 
“essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning…” (Benjamin 221). Because my 
metapicture is again being reproduced to appear on this page it is pushed out of the 
“sphere of authenticity” (220). That sphere is inhabitable through digital mediation. An 
awareness of interactivity within this medium is known to the spectator/participant, the 
gaze of one user unto another through the aperture of the image/text. 
 My invitation to a metapicture is not a comparative discourse within online 
religion. The most damaging aspect of the subfield is a propensity to force comparison 
between media and religion. Treating both as discrete sets of motivations and agents of 
power, such analysis is inherently comparative. Mitchell’s tool of the metapicture gets 
between this dialectic, as the third space, as the sand of the page, as a way of negotiating 
practices within their own frame. The textually bound language within this space (as 
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opposed to the language of the image) works towards a way of understanding that goes 
beyond its own textual frame. Beyond the metapicture is textual ekphrasis, the faithful 
description. The ekphrastic description is “the verbal representation of visual 
representation” (Picture Theory 152). The textual work of ekphrasis is the visual work of 
the metapicture. The hope of ekphrasis is to go beyond text to describe such a theory of 
images. “Words can “cite” but never “sight” their objects. Ekphrasis then, is a curiosity: 
it is the name of a minor and rather obscure literary genre (poems which describe works 
of visual art) and of a more general topic (the verbal representations of visual 
representations)…” (Picture Theory 152).  
 Both the ekphrastic description and the metapicture of visual being foster the 
importance of spectatorship, of seeing being, of seeing practice. Avatars desire to be seen 
as alive, as residents
36
 of the media habitat. Seeing the avatar through the aperture of the 
image/text allows for the experience of the living image in digital practice. The 
image/text as a figuration of semantic democracy means both the avatar picture and 
companion textual utterances define the expressive boundaries of a digital being. Seeing 
image-text relationships played out through chatting in Second Life or the text mediation 
relayed in my metapicture, along with Tweets, Facebook updates and YouTube 
comments all affirm the living image, give access to the “sphere of authenticity”, of 
originality. Visual ontology visually animates the imagetext (composite) through the 
image/text (aperture).  
                                                 
36
 Agreeably, users of Second Life are referred to as “residents” within the developer’s literature. See 
Rymaszewski 
Second Life : The Official Guide  
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 Turning to the second question posed above: How does visual ontology help 
better understand religious practice online and (more broadly) being online? I would like 
to draw a few connections between the conclusions reached above and the trends in 
scholarship observed early on, before making a few predictions about the future of the 
subfield.  
 My introduction of a visual ontology confronts the anxieties of retaining a sense 
of humanity within a bio-cyber-religio relationship. Inside and outside the discipline 
Turkle, Terranova, Stolow, Dawson, TL Taylor and others all negotiate the tensions 
between human and apparatus. Early scholarship fantasized about escaping humanity 
altogether into a cyber-reality, utilizing the apparatus as a means of release from the 
human condition.
37
 Consequent scholarship was filled with disappointment, cynicism, 
and pessimism. Currently the subfield is working to define itself amongst contemporary 
technology. This in the statement by Hoover: “Yet we have to keep in mind that at some 
fundamental level digital religion is essentially about religion and spirituality. It is not 
about changing the world and politics; it is about people using technologies to live out the 
spiritual”(Digital Religion 268). Hoover clarifies that as a situated practice, being online 
or being religious online is not a political stance or declaration about the state of 
organized religion in contemporary society. It is a personal act.  
 This engaged personal relationship with technological practices is expressed in 
my fledgling, questioning methodology introduced by way of Mitchell’s picture theory. 
Investigating visual ontology exercises Mitchell’s theoretical mechanisms outside his 
material lens. Like Cowan questioning the rubric of old media, Herring’s suggesting 
contextual theology, and O’Leary’s utilizing Ong, my metapicture of visual ontology 
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 For more on this history see Brians on works like Gibson’s Neuromancer and Stepehnson’s Snowcrash 
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attempts to “see” digital religious practice through a method previously unengaged in 
such scholarship. Conceptualizing (metapicturing) the avatar as living image and as 
imagetext brings Visual Studies into digital-religious cultural studies in a way that does 
not trivialize the aesthetics of experience, but reorients the expectations of these 
aesthetics. Broadly speaking, picturing a re-engaged reading of Benjamin visualizes 
being online. Such visualization could help the projects of Connelly, Helland, Hill-Smith, 
and Wagner engage with the aesthetics of Buddhism in Second Life, instances of virtual 
pilgrimage and virtual-ritual-game spaces respectively.  
 Lastly, looking ahead, what can be expected of coming research in online 
religious experience? My investment is in the pictures and images of digital experience. I 
think Stewart Hoover’s colleague is correct when s/he says “what really defines much of 
online practice is the aesthetic…”(Digital Religion 268). Many, including Campbell and 
Lundby, call for a more nuanced methodologies and “typologies for categorization and 
interpretation” (Digital Religion 10). This is the wrong direction, and I hope my work has 
shown an active resistance to both typologies and categories of experience. Concerned 
with such reification of terms, Jeremy Stolow opposes a typology: “Perhaps, therefore, 
the only safe way to make use of these terms is to place them in the category that 
rhetoricians call cathachresis. A cathachresis is a figure of speech that denotes a thing 
that otherwise cannot be named, because there is no proper referent, as in the popular 
example “the legs of a table”. By emptying out the words “religion” and “technology” 
and thereby drawing attention to the underlying disjuncture between these words and 
their absent referents, might not this serve to make new room for the many hybrids that 
lie beneath the semantic divide, each awaiting its own opportunity to be made visible as a 
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god in the machine?”(Stolow 19).  Maybe the avatar as the living imagetext, made visible 
through the aperture of the image/text in the “semantic divide”, awaits such an 
opportunity.  
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